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Using our updated model of the payment exchange system within the banking industry, we have 
introduced sudden local economic shocks and calculated their effect on the stability of the 
financial system. Our results suggest that the probability of a total banking failure, i.e., the 
systemic risk of the system, is insignificant unless the degree of the shock and the degree of 
integration between banks are very large. We find that the larger the shock, i.e., the greater the 
amount of loss amongst all banks, and the more isolated banks are within the payment system, 
the greater the likelihood of a localized or global banking system failure. However, given the 
current limits percentages of capitol banks can loan each other, only worldwide economic crises 
of cataclysmic significance would cause a collapse of the entire banking system. Hence we 
affirm the findings of our previous work which considered the effects of a bank failure generated 
by factors internal to the banking system (internal instead of internal shocks), which suggest 
there is minimal systemic risk in an integrated, minimally regulated, banking system. 
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Introduction 
Fears are often generated about the stability of the international financial system after any 
financial setback or disaster. This is usually reflected in the bond and stock markets.  Either 
periodically, or in response to a financial crisis, financial institutions undergo extensive reviews 
of their risk management models.  Government officials and other regulators frequently suggest 
ways, often in the form of new regulations, to "stabilize" the financial system in order to prevent 
systemic failure. Sometimes the financial crisis affects only a localized area such as a country 
like Russia or Mexico or a section of the world such as Asia or Latin America. Other times the 
crises can affect the entire globe. Still the dominant question is: Can financial systems fail, or is 
a liquidity crisis the worst of outcomes from a crisis caused by an external shock? 
 
In this paper we continue our study of systemic risk (Gould, Naftilan, Khoury and Wright, 2000) 
and further refine the likelihood of systemic failure.  Our research continues to show that 
systemic failure is practically impossible under the least restrictive assumptions of bank 
management behavior and the prudent man rule. The focus of this study is on the effects of 
sudden local economic shocks on the stability of the financial system.   
 
As with our previous work, the number of variables involved in our model is too large to allow 
for a closed form solution for the estimation of the probability of a systemic failure.  Indeed we 
have further complicate our simulation, but increased its accuracy, by adding the effects of local 
shocks on the financial system. 
  
This paper is organized as follows: section 1 delivers the foundation to the model; section 2 Page 3 of 26 
describes our basic model from our previous work; section 3 describes the modifications to the 




Systemic risk, the possibility that the sudden unanticipated failure of one or several banks could 
trigger a "domino-like" collapse of a large segment of the banking system, has been the subject 
of a number of publications.  See: Agelietta (1996), Angelini, Maresca and Russo (1994), 
Bordo, Mizrach and Schwartz (1995), Giles (1996), Kaufman (1994) and Gould, Naftilan, 
Khoury & Wright (2000).  By establishing a deposit insurance system, the federal government 
has established itself as a lender of last resort. However, it has also generated a large set of 
regulations aimed at minimizing the perceived possibility of a systemic failure.  Concerns about 
systemic risk have grown recently as banks increasingly engaged in interbank loans, the foreign 
exchange markets, OTC derivative trading, and fast increasing volumes in the settlement 
systems. 
 
There have been several studies on systemic risk which have focused on the interbank loan 
market and the settlement systems.  On an average day, many trillions of dollars pass through 
the world's payment networks and settlement systems.  It is known that daylight overdrafts are 
frequently huge, often exceeding the capital basis of the bank.  In examining the possibility of 
systemic failure, the two largest payment systems, Fedwire and CHIPS, have received the most 
attention.  Most researchers have focused on possible ripple effects in CHIPS, since the Federal 
Reserve guarantees payment finality in the Fedwire system that it administers.  In his study, Page 4 of 26 
Humphrey (1986) took actual CHIPS balance sheets, and simulated the effect of one bank, 
usually the largest debtor on a given day, defaulting.  His results suggested that unwinding 
linkage used by CHIPS could lead to a large number of linked failures.  Due to these findings, 
CHIPS instituted new reserve requirements and regulations aimed at reducing these risks. The 
more recent study by McAndrews and Wasilyew (1995), henceforth referred to as MW, 
suggested even further possibilities of systemic failure.  
 
The bank settlement system is not the only area of concern.  It has been suggested that the 
foreign exchange market could be a source of systemic risk such as in the case of the Herstatt 
Bank failure in 1976.  While derivatives are probably less of a concern, since the netting 
arrangements tend to keep the settlement payments small, and since members post large 
collateral and are limited in the amount of overdraft they can incur. 
 
Given that most studies have suggested systemic risk is real and likely, Gould, Naftilan, Khoury 
& Wright (2000), henceforth referred to as GNKW, evaluated the risk by developing a 
simulation of the payment system.  We began by examining the only working model for the 
payment system (MW) and found several unrealistic assumptions of their assumed payment 
system. From this analysis, we developed a more realistic and rigorous model. Using a simple 
rule, where banks would pool their payments, we showed that systemic risk was essentially 
impossible except in the most extreme cases.    The prudent man rule, which we refer to as the 
diversification rule, was the minimal amount of regulation required to stabilize the entire 
financial system. 
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In this paper, we have refined our simulation outlined in the GNKW paper. We continue to be 
interested in three issues: 1) how does the number of banks in a system affect the possibility of 
systemic risk?  2) How does the likelihood of any two banks in the system exchanging loans 
(payments) affect the possibility of systemic risk?  3) How does the size of payments between 
banks affect the possibility of systemic risk?  However to this we have added: 4) how does local 
financial crises affect the possibility of system risk? 5) How does globalization of the financial 
markets affect global systemic risk?  6) Is the prudent man rule still sufficient enough to limit 
the possibility of systemic failure?  
 
In these questions we are addressing situations where sudden economic shocks affect a local 
area. These local shocks could come in the form of depressed real estate values localized to a 
city or state, or a sudden and very large devaluation of a currency to a country.  
 
Description of the basic model: 
For the basic model of the payment system, the banking industry consists of equal sized banks 
loaning money to each other.  It is a closed system; hence, the sum of all debt within the system 
is equal to the net credit within the system. The general structure of the simulation consists of 
generating loans between banks, closing the bank with the largest net debt, handling the 
payments to and from the defaulting bank either by calling all loans from the defaulting bank or 
by paying off loans to other banks at a reduced rate, closing banks which suddenly experience 
an unexpected net loss and continuing until either no more banks remain or the remaining banks 
are able to absorb the total loss within the system.  The closing of banks after the failure of the 
first bank is referred to as the unwinding of the system.  Page 6 of 26 
 
The condition used to determine if a bank must close, i.e, the unexpected net loss, was first used 
by David Humphrey (1986) who was also the first to simulate the effects of a failure in the 
payment system.  In the model, banks that experience unexpected net losses beyond a pre-
established threshold are forced to close. In the end, the model reports the key measurements of 
a successful payment settlement system: (1) the probability that the unwinding finds a non-zero 
subset of banks which can support the payments, and  (2) the fraction of surviving banks after 
the default of the largest net debtor and the subsequent unwinding.  We consider these measures 
acceptable indicators of the probability of systemic risk in the banking system.  
 
As described in GNKW, the key parameters in the model are: N, the number of banks; p, the 
probability of any two banks exchanging payments (henceforth known as interaction 
probability); d, the threshold level of unexpected net debit (henceforth known as payment 
default threshold); and σ
2, the variance of the bilateral net debit between any two banks; rL, the 
loan sale rate, i.e., the rate at which a bank receives payment on a loan to a defaulting bank. 
Typical values for N, the number of banks, are from 5 to 300; typical values used for the 
interaction probability, p are 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9; and typical values used for the loan sale rate, rL, 
are 0.60 and 0.80. Since all banks possess an asset size of one, typical values of 0.02 and 0.03 
are used for the payment default threshold, and values of 0.2 and 0.4 for the variance of bilateral 
net debit, depending upon the simulation.   
 
Using the initial parameters described above, the simulation generates loans and closes banks 
when the unexpected net loss exceeds the payment default threshold. The unexpected net loss is Page 7 of 26 
calculated by examining the difference between the original total bilateral net debit, referred to 
as the multilateral net debit at the beginning of the simulation and the multilateral net debit after 
the initial bank is closed.  For more details, refer to the appendix at the end of the paper. 
[Note: GNKW also investigated the effect that banks vary in asset size. For this study we kept 
all banks at an equal size.] 
 
In our original study, we found likelihood of system risk was eliminated using a pooling 
technique known as the diversification rule. This rule attempts to distribute net debt from a 
single bank across the entire banking system.  This rule is so successful that in our data, we 
could actually increase the variance of bilateral net debit an order of magnitude (from 0.04 to 
0.4) thus allowing the banks to create even larger loans, or reduce the payment default threshold 
significantly thus making banks more sensitive to failure.  In general, we found that by using the 
diversification rule, while the mean net loan value between any two banks decreases signifi-
cantly, banks can still possess very large multilateral net debit - several times the size of their 
assets. In this paper we include the diversification rule with our modifications to the original 
model. 
 
Description of Simulation modifications: 
For this study, we made two basic modifications to the GNKW model (with or without the 
diversification rule). They were: 
 
I) starting the simulation in a dynamic mode. Before, the banks were assigned, at random, 
payments with other banks after which the greatest net debtor was closed the unwinding process Page 8 of 26 
was initiated. In the new model, banks were allowed to exchange payments for several rounds 
and the closing of banks was not triggered until one of the following possible conditions 
occurred: 
  1) a bank within the system possessed a multilateral net debit beyond the payment default 
threshold; 
  2) the multilateral net debit was beyond several times the payment default threshold; or 
  3) a review of the banks was performed after some random number of rounds of payment 
exchanges. 
We investigated the effects of the three possible conditions individually.  
 
II) Add increased loss of income in local areas. To model the effects of local shocks, we created 
areas where there would be a local shock and hence we would find reduced values for loans in 
the payment system.  For this we created a set of new parameters. The first was the pL, the 
percentage of the banks that were within an area of sudden depressed currency or economic 
value, i.e., the percentage of banks within an area where a local shock occurs, and rsL, the rate at 
which loans from these banks within the area would be repaid. Numerically, rsL is less than rL. 
Finally, we created a parameter dL, the distance factor, which was used to change the probability 
of interaction between any two banks. If dL was small, the possibility of any two banks exchange 
payments was limited to nearest neighbors. If dL was infinite, the likelihood of any two banks 
exchanging payments was constant across the entire banking system. 
 
The appendix provides more details as to how the simulation was written.  
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Results and Analysis: 
The results of our simulation are reported in the tables shown below. Each table is laid out as 
follows: unless otherwise noted, σ
2, the variance of bilateral net debit and d, the payment default 
threshold were held constant.  Each column corresponds to a specific value for N, the number of 
banks, while each row corresponds to a specific value for p, the probability of payment 
exchange between any two banks.  Each element in the table is the percentage of banks that 
survive after the top debtor is removed and the subsequent unwinding. We report the mean 
percentage of surviving banks after 500 runs. 
 
For example, according to the Table A in Table Set I, for 200 banks at an interaction probability 
of 0. 9, where loans to a defaulting bank are settled at 60% of the original value, on the average, 
94 percent of the banks survive the shock of the system. 
 
Table Set I shows data from the original model in GNKW.  In Table A of Table Set I, the 
payment default threshold was set to 0.2 of the capitalization of bank while the variance of 
bilateral of net debit was set to 0.02. Loans from defaulting banks were called immediately and 
loans to defaulting banks were paid off at a reduced rate. Here it is 60% of the original value. 
(This is the value used throughout the study.) 
 
In this simulation, we found that as the number of banks increased and as the interaction 
between banks increased, the percentage of banks that survived after the failure of a single bank 
decreased. This is shown in a more dramatic effect in Table B of Table Set I where the variance 
of bilateral net debit was increased to 0.04. As the completely unregulated banks increased Page 10 of 26 
interactions between each other, i.e., continue to mount possible debt between each other, the 
likelihood of systemic failure increased to the point that on the average with 300 banks 
interacting at a probability value of 0.9, only 5% of the banks would remain after the failure of 
the most debt ridden bank. Table C reinforces this result where the payment default threshold is 
decreased, thus making banks more sensitive to failure.  
 
Table Set II demonstrates the remarkable impact of the diversification rule - the pooling of the 
banks funds and spreading loans over a wider spectrum of banks. The conditions for generating 
Table A in Table Set II were identical for Table B in Table Set I with the exception of the 
inclusion of the diversification rule. The result is the system increased its stability with an 
increase in the number of banks and probability of exchange. Indeed, in Table B of Table Set II, 
the variance of bilateral net debit was increased by an order of magnitude and yet the effect is 
still opposite to those seen in Table Set I.  
 
Table C of Table Set II shows the mean value for the bilateral net debit of the top defaulting 
bank for the different values for the parameters p and N. As we increased the interaction 
between banks and the number of banks in the pool, the bank with the most debt was able to 
generate vastly excessive debt before being declared insolvent. And yet, as Table B shows, the 
system was virtually unaffected by the failure of this bank. 
 
Table Set III shows data from the modifications done to add a dynamic element to the 
simulation. The parameters in Table A of this set were identical those in Table B of Table Set I 
except that the unwinding was triggered after a round where the bank with the largest Page 11 of 26 
multilateral net debit exceeded the payment default threshold. To within a standard deviation for 
each run of the simulation, the two tables are identical suggesting that the original model was 
sufficiently "dynamic."  With the new triggering conditions, the simulation was run using the 
parameters found in Table B of Table Set II (the inclusion of the diversification rule). Table B of 
Table Set III reproduces Table B in Table Set II nearly to a number. 
 
In Table C of Table Set III, we used the parameters from Table A except set the triggering 
mechanism to be when a bank's multilateral net debit exceeded the payment default threshold by 
a factor of 10. This allows a bank to achieve a tremendous debt before being declared insolvent. 
We found that with the exception of the conditions where N is small, Table C reproduced Table 
A which is identical to the "non-dynamic" model. The reason the percentage of banks failed in 
Table C was greater than in Table A for smaller N was because when banks were generating 
multilateral net debit of such size, they were doing it by creating loans of substantial size with 
only a few banks. Since there were fewer banks in the system, the few banks that did fail 
represented a larger percentage of the number of banks in the system.  
 
The initial parameters of Table D of Table Set III were set to those in Table B of Table Set II, 
i.e., the diversification rule is applied to the system. The only difference was the use of the 
triggering system for bank closings which, like Table C of Table Set III, occurred when a bank 
has exceeded the payment default threshold by a factor of 10. Again except for systems where N 
is small, the results are identical.  We found that the triggering occurs after 10-30 rounds of 
payments. 
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In Tables E, F and G for Table Set III, a third type of triggering system was used. Here the 
banks were allowed to exchange payments for 100 rounds before the top debtor was closed and 
the unwinding process was performed. We found that some banks were able to generate huge 
amounts of loans (see Table F) depending upon how frequently the banks exchanged payments. 
With no regulations, unchecked banks did produce scenarios where complete failure was 
observed (see Table E). We deemed the amount of possible net debt to be too excessive, hence 
unrealistic, and eliminated the dynamic model from the system.  
 
In Table Set IV, we report the results of adding the local shock to the system. We used the 
dynamical system where the trigger for bank closure consisted of a bank exceeding the payment 
default threshold by several times its asset size. We did so because we wanted to test the system 
under the most extreme but realistic conditions. 
 
To incorporate the local effects, we set the parameter pL, the fraction of banks which experience 
a local shock to 0.10 in Tables A and B and to 0.20 in Tables C and D and provided the 
maximum shock by reducing loans values to bank closed in the area of sudden depressed 
financial status to 10% of their original value. In Tables A and C, the diversification rule was 
not applied. In Tables B and D, the diversification rule was applied. Again, when the 
diversification rule was applied, the variance of bilateral net debit was increased from 0.04 to 
0.4. 
 
We see that as we increased the size of the area which suddenly experiences depressed loan 
values, the affect on the other banks is more pronounced as fewer banks survived the unwinding Page 13 of 26 
process. However, the effects are small and do not change the overall properties of the system – 
particularly the one where the diversification rule was applied. 
 
In Table Set V we see the effects of globalization which was part of the original model. Here we 
repeated the experiments reported in Tables C and D of Table Set III except we localized any 
possible interaction between banks. Specifically, the probability of interaction between banks 
was changed to be inversely proportional between the distance between the banks. For example, 
nearest neighbor banks such as banks i, i+1 and i-1 were more likely to exchange payments than 
banks i and i + N/2. (Note bank 1 and bank N are considered nearest neighbors.) The "distance" 
used to for the example runs shown in Tables A and B in Table Set V is 0.1, i.e., 10% of the 
total distance N. 
  
We see when we compare Tables A and B which includes the localization effect with the 
equivalent tables C and D of Table Set III where exchange probability is independent of 
distance, the effect of localizing payment exchanges is significant both in the completely 
unregulated market and the system where the diversification rule is applied. This is because in 
the simulation, collections of banks were more likely to completely fail should one bank within 
that collection fail. Its few loans with the few other banks produced the famous  “domino” 
effect, suggesting that systemic risk is likely in environments where free trade is highly 
restricted. Note though that some banks are able to “isolate” themselves in the unregulated 
market and hence reduce the likelihood of total systemic failure. 
 
By increasing the distance a bank could exchange with another bank, we found the effects of the Page 14 of 26 
localization were reduced and the stable financial system we see in the original model based 
upon a global market was reproduced. 
 
Summary 
A crises in the financial market can be found in several situations: it may be as dramatic as a 
sudden devaluation of the currency, an unexpected drop in the real estate market, a sudden loss 
in trust in a stock market or the onset of massive inflation. The question remains how much 
regulation is required to guarantee the security of the financial system. Remarkably, the answer 
is to use the prudent man rule and diversify a banks expenses and assets. In this paper, we have 
modeled the effects of local and some global shocks on a closed financial system. While we find 
that a complete lack of regulation could lead to a system of significant systemic risk, the prudent 
men rule and a reasonable limit on interbank lending (in terms of p capitol) can practically 
eliminate this risk.. 
 
We examined 2 basic modifications to the original GNKW model. The first was to add a 
dynamic element to the payment exchange system. While we examined several possible models, 
we choose the most realistic but still potential dangerous model. We then used this modification 
to examine the effects of local shocks to the system. Not surprisingly, we found that as we 
increased the number of financial institutions affected by the sudden reduction in value of assets, 
the possibility of excessive financial disaster increased. However, the diversification rule 
continued to provide stability to the system.  
 
Finally, we examined the effect of globalization by allowing the banks to either perform Page 15 of 26 
exchanges only locally or globally.  The results were clear - by increasing the possible 
interactions between banks, the probability of local and global failure of the financial system 
decreased for the more realistic model with the diversification rule. 
 
In conclusion, we reaffirm our view that a heavy regulatory burden on the banking sector is not 
necessary to assure bank stability.  What are needed, it appears, are only the prudent man rule, 
good supervision, and adherence to extensive risk diversification to anchor the stability of the 
banking system. Page 16 of 26 
Table Set I: GNKW Model: 
 
Table A 
Table entries: average percentage of banks remaining after the default of the largest net 
debtor and the subsequent unwinding of process. Payment default threshold = 0.2, 
variance of bilateral net debit = 0.02, loan sale rate = 60%. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  0.5  100 100 100 100 100 100     95 
  0.9  100  100    99    97    97    94    94 
 
Table B 
Payment default threshold=0.2, variance of bilateral net debit=0.04, loan sale rate=60%. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  99 99 99 99 99 99 98 
  0.5  99 96 85 67 53 33 15 
  0.9  98 80 54 40 31 12     5 
 
Table C 
Payment default threshold=0.1, variance of bilateral net debit=0.04, loan sale rate=60%. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  91 93 90 74 29     0.2      0 
  0.5  81    7    0.3    0    0    0    0 
  0.9  61    0.6    0    0    0    0    0 Page 17 of 26 
Table Set II: Original Model with Diversification rule 
 
Table A 
Table entries: average percentage of banks remaining after the default of the largest net 
debtor and the subsequent unwinding of process. Payment default threshold = 0.2, 
variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 60%. Diversification rule applied. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1      95 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  0.5  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  0.9  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table B 
Payment default threshold=0.2, variance of bilateral net debit=0.4, loan sale rate = 60%. 
Diversification rule applied. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  75  92    97    99    99  100  100 
  0.5  78  99      99 100 100 100 100 
  0.9  85  99  100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table C 
Mean value for greatest net debtor’s bilateral net debit across 500 runs. Payment default 
threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.4. Diversification rule applied. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  1.06 1.32 1.48 1.69 1.64 1.78 1.83 
  0.5  0.73 1.22 1.42 1.49 1.57 1.74 1.81  
  0.9  0.71 1.23 1.43 1.51 1.55 1.75 1.86 
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Table Set III: Effects of Dynamic modification  
 
Table A 
Table entries: average percentage of banks remaining after the default of the largest net 
debtor and the subsequent unwinding of process. Payment default threshold = 0.2, 
variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 60%. No diversification rule. 
Unwinding is triggered when at least one bank exceeds the payment default threshold. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  98  99  100 100 100 100 99 
  0.5  98  96    81    66    55    28  15 
  0.9  98  77    52    45    32    17    6 
 
Table B 
Payment default threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.4, loan sale rate = 
60%. Diversification rule applied. Unwinding is triggered when at least one bank exceeds 
the payment default threshold. (Note variance is 10 times larger than in Table A.) 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  73    92    97    99  100  100  100 
  0.5  80      99 100 100 100 100 100 
  0.9  83  100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table C 
Payment default threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 
60%. No diversification rule. Unwinding is triggered when at least one bank exceeds 10 
times the payment default threshold. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  70 85 87 89 86 94 98 
  0.5  48 29 57 64 55 29 17 
  0.9  25 29 53 43 31 12     5 
 
Table D 
Payment default threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.4, loan sale rate = 
60%. Diversification rule applied. Unwinding is triggered when at least one bank exceeds 
10 times the payment default threshold. (Note variance is 10 times larger than in Table 
C.) 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  72  85  91    99    97  100  100 
  0.5  51 58 97     99  100  100  100 Page 19 of 26 
  0.9  29 68 98 100  100  100  100 
Table E  
Payment default threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 
60%. No diversification rule. Unwinding is triggered after 100 rounds of payments. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  67 67 19 5  1  0  0 
  0.5  34    0    0  0  0  0  -- 
  0.9    7    0    0  0  0  --  -- 
 
Table F  
Mean value for greatest net debtor’s multilateral net debit across 500 runs. Payment 
default threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 60%. No 
diversification rule. Unwinding is triggered after 100 rounds of payments. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  2.3      6.7 10.7 14.0 16.7 25.0 32.2 
  0.5  3.7  14.2 23.1 29.7 35.9 55.9      --   




Payment default threshold = 0.2, variance of bilateral net debit = 0.4, loan sale rate = 
60%. Diversification rule applied. Unwinding is triggered after 100 rounds of payments. 
(Note variance is 10 times larger than in Table A.) 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  64 61 16 4  1  0  0 
  0.5  31      0  0 0 0 0 -- 
  0.9    6    0  0  0  0  --  -- 
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Table Set IV: Effects of Local Shocks  
 
Table A 
Table entries: average percentage of banks remaining after the default of the largest net 
debtor and the subsequent unwinding of process. Payment default threshold = 0.2, 
variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 60%. No diversification rule. 
Unwinding is triggered when at least one bank exceeds 10 times the payment default 
threshold. A local shock affects 10% of the banks. The resale value of loans to these 
banks is 10% of the original value. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  67 83 85 85 81 88 83 
  0.5  43 24 53 56 50 25 14 
  0.9  20 27 49 39 27 13     8 
 
Table B 
Initial parameters identical to those found in Table A except that the variance of bilateral 
net debit = 0.4 and the diversification rule is applied. A local shock affects 10% of the 
banks. The resale value of loans to these banks is 10% of the original value. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  66 82 82 79 80     92      96 
  0.5  42 32 66 85 89     98  100 
  0.9  18 43 85 91 93 100  100 
 
Table C 
Initial parameters identical to Table A except local shock affects 20% of the banks. The 
resale value of loans to these banks is 10% of the original value. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  66 83 81 76 71 72 64 
  0.5  42 18 46 50 43 22 11 
  0.9  16 23 39 32 29 11     3 
 
Table D 
Initial parameters identical to Table B except that local shock affects 20% of the banks. 
The resale value of loans to these banks is 10% of the original value. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  66 80 78 73 70 81     87 
  0.5  39 22 61 74 83 93     99 
  0.9  15 35 70 81 83 99 100 Page 21 of 26 
Table Set V: Effects of Local banking   
 
Table A 
Table entries: average percentage of banks remaining after the default of the largest net 
debtor and the subsequent unwinding of process. Payment default threshold = 0.2, 
variance of bilateral net debit = 0.04, loan sale rate = 60%. No diversification rule. 
Unwinding is triggered when at least one bank exceeds 10 times the payment default 
threshold. Banking is limited to nearest neighbors at +/- 10% of N banks.   
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  60 42 47 62 55 31 19 
  0.5  62 38 43 64 55 30 21 
  0.9  61 34 48 65 55 33 21 
 
Table B 
Initial parameters identical to those found in Table A except that the variance of bilateral 
net debit = 0.4 and the diversification rule is applied. Banking is limited to nearest 
neighbors at +/- 10% of N banks. 
 
Probability of              Number of banks 
interaction  5  25 50 75 100  200  300 
  0.1  59 19 13 35 57     98  100 
  0.5  61 41 61 89 99 100  100 
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Appendix: Technical description of simulation  
Basic model: 
The payment system of the banking industry is programmed by creating a N by N matrix, B, 
where entries of the matrix represent net payments from bank i to bank j - i is the column and j 
is the row.  The simulation begins by assigning, at random, exchange interaction values (either 
yes or no) between pairs of banks. A binomial distribution with p, the exchange probability 
variable which is defined before the simulation begins, as the mean for the distribution is used to 
create the exchange interaction grid. Typical values for the probability of payment exchange are 
10%, 50% and 90%.  For each exchange, a random value based upon a normal or Gaussian 
distribution centered around zero is then assigned. This number represents the net payment 
between any two banks. Hence Bij = - Bji. The variance of the normal distribution for net 
payment, σ
2, is assigned before the simulation begins. Once the payment matrix is filled, the 
multilateral net debit for each bank is calculated:  
 
Fi = Σ Bij. 
 
The initial value for each bank is stored as Fi(0) so that it can be used for comparison with future 
multilateral net debit values. 
 
The simulation begins by identifying the bank with the largest net debit. This bank is closed and 
is dropped from the simulation. The payments to and from this bank are then investigated. In the 
original MW model, all payments are eliminated, but in our previous work in this area, GNKW, 
we argued that loans to the defaulting bank should not be forgotten, but instead should be called. Page 23 of 26 
In addition, loans that the defaulting bank owes on can be sold at a discounted rate. For this 
paper, our model is based upon the GNKW model - that there is a procedure in working with 
payments to and from a defaulting bank. Once this bank is eliminated and its loans are handled, 
the simulation recalculates the multilateral net debit for each bank, Fi, which changes given that 
some loans must be paid off immediately and that loans to a defaulted bank are now worth less 
than their original value. The difference between the new multilateral net debit and the original 
multilateral net debit is defined as the unexpected net debit.  If the difference between the two 
values exceeds the predefined payment default threshold, d, the bank is considered to be in 
financial difficulty and is marked to be closed. The simulation continues by closing all marked 
banks and settling the payments between the marked banks and the standing banks. The 
simulation then recalculates the multilateral net debit for the remaining banks and determines if 
any are in financial difficulty. This process continues until either no banks remain or that the 
remaining banks possess unexpected net debit below the payment default threshold.  
 
When the run is completed, the number of remaining banks and remaining payments are 
recorded. The simulation is run 500 times and a mean for the number of remaining banks and 
payments is reported. 
 
Finally, our implementation of the diversification rule which eliminates systemic risk was 
performed by taking the variance of net debit, i.e., the possible size of a loan, and dividing it by 
both the probability of interaction and the number of banks.   
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Modifications to basic model: 
The simulation was modified to add a dynamic element to the payment exchange process. The 
banks would be allowed to exchange payments until one of the conditions, chosen at the begin, 
were satisfied which would trigger bank closings. The three conditions investigated were: 
  1) the multilateral net debit, Fi for some bank was greater the default payment threshold, d. 
  2) Fi, was beyond several times d; or 
  3) a review of the banks were performed after some predefined number of rounds of payment 
exchanges. 
 
As before, the interaction grid - the matrix which stored information as to whether two banks 
would exchange payments - was created first. Then using the random number generator with a 
normal distribution centered around zero and with a variance set by the parameter σ
2, payments 
between those banks which possessed payment interactions were generated.  The multilateral net 
debit for each bank, Fi, was then calculated. If the predefined condition for bank closing was 
satisfied, the rounds of payment exchanges would stop and the simulation would execute the 
procedures as defined in the original model. If the predefined condition for bank closing was not 
satisfied, a new set of payments between banks would be added to the original set of payments. 
This would continue until either one of the conditions was satisfied or the number of rounds of 
payment exchanges exceed 10,000 at which point the simulation would stop and the run would 
be eliminated from the measurements. 
 
The local shocks 
As part of modeling the local shocks, the new parameters, pL the percentage of banks within an Page 25 of 26 
area where a local shock occurs, rsL, the rate at which loans to those banks within the area would 
be repaid and dL, the distance factor, were assigned values. All local shocks occurred within 
banks between 1 and pL * N. The effect of the shocks was model in the loans paid off by 
defaulting banks. When banks were closed in area where there was a local shock, rsL instead of 
rL, was used to calculate the value of the loans. In the model for the isolation of banks, we 
created a normal distribution function centered around zero where 1/ dL
2 was the variance. The 
difference between any two banks dbanks = (i - j) was used as the distance between any two 
banks. Note we calculated this distance module N so that bank 1 and bank N were considered 
nearest neighbors. We then calculated the relative distance dbanks / N in the distribution function 
to find a multiplicative for the interaction probability parameter used to determine the likelihood 
that any two banks would exchange payments. 
 Page 26 of 26 
References: 
1.      Agelietta, Michael, 1996,  "Systemic Risk, financial Innovations, and the Financial Safety 
Net." In Money in Motion: 7he Post Keynesian and Circulation Approaches, edited by Ghislain 
Deleplaca and Edward J. Nell. pp 552-581. 
2.      Angelini, P. G. Maresca, and D. Russo, 1994.  "Systemic Risk in the Netting system." 
Journal of Banking and Finance.  Volume 20, pp.853-868. 
3.      Bordo, Michael D., Bruce Mizrach, and Anna J. Schwartz, 1995.  "Real Versus Psuedo-
International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons From History." National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper 5371. 
4.      Giles, Martin, 1996, April 27.  "The Domino Effect: A Survey of International Banking." 
The Economist. 
5.    Gould, Scot A.C, Naftilan, Stephen A.., Khoury, Sarkis J. and Wright, Danae J., 2000, 
"Systemic Risk: A More Rigorous and Realistic Simulation", to appear as proceedings of 
Financial Innovations and the Welfare of Nations Conference, Tufts University, Kluwer 
Academic Press.  
6.      Humphrey, David B., 1986, "Payment Finality and Risk of Settlement Failure." 
Technology and the Regulation of Financial Markets, edited by Anthony Saunders and 
Lawrence J. White,  Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, pp. 97-120. 
7.      Kaufman, 1994, G.G. Journal of Financial Services Research,  pp. 123. 
8.      McAndrews, James J., George Wasilyew, 1995, "Simulations of Failure in a Payment 
System.  Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 95-19. 
 